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The Honorable Allen Linden*
Thank you for your only slightly exaggerated claims on my behalf,
Dean Starr and Professor Lewis Klar. Thank you all for being here with us
at Pepperdine, my adopted home, where I resurrected my teaching career
eleven years ago as a winter term Adjunct Professor under Dean Ron
Phillips and where I, luckily, remain here still, this year as Distinguished
Visiting Jurist, thanks to the kindness of Dean Starr.
On reaching seventy-five years of age last October, I had to stop
traveling the circuit as a Justice of the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal
from Atlantic to Pacific to Arctic, "dispensing with justice," as we jokingly
phrased it; no longer could I proudly proclaim, "have gavel, will travel."
You can imagine my delight when Dean Starr this last autumn gave me, for
my seventy-fifth birthday present, seventy-five fresh-faced first-year law
students to teach, which I undertook with great relish, but with some
trepidation. During that magical fall term I learned that law students were
much the same as they always were, although thankfully more diverse,
intellectually more qualified, undoubtedly better equipped with computers at
their desks, sadly more financially stressed, scarily more outspoken and
independent, but encouragingly still excited, optimistic, and eager to help
make the world a better place.
I also learned that the American law of torts, although certainly more
omnipresent and more sophisticated, is not very different from what it was
fifty years ago when I first encountered it. The central core of U.S. tort law
is still solid. It has learned from and survived the law and economics
movement, the feminist critique, and the critical legal studies onslaught. Its
philosophical underpinnings have been better identified, of course, and its
content, though adjusted, has been largely reaffirmed and refined by decades
of decisions. Although American tort law may not be broken, it is badly
bruised and needs repair. Yes, there are lots of warts on torts. But while
American tort law should not be idolized, neither should it be demonized.
For much of this repair work has already been done, with the help of many
* Distinguished Visiting Jurist, Pepperdine University School of Law, April 2010.
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of you in this room, but much more remains to be done-toxic torts,
cybertorts, environmental torts, medical torts, etc.-which is why we have
assembled here.
How lucky was I, as a Canadian graduate student, to first encounter U.S.
Tort Law in 1960 in the classroom of William Lloyd Prosser at U.C.
Berkeley, where I was warmly welcomed. I had turned down a scholarship
offer from Harvard Law School, choosing instead to study with Prosser, at
that time the Dean of the law school. Prosser, a true titan of torts, was in his
prime. He was the author of the hornbook' that had already become the
Bible of U.S. tort law, the Reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,2
and a dramatic classroom and conference legend who not only knew the
citation of every important tort case, but could quote entire passages from
them. After attending ninety of his classes, indeed after only a dozen or so, I
was hooked. I couldn't help it. I became, and remain to this day, a
tortaholic who gets no kick from champagne but who still gets a kick out of
torts. No Malibu rehab center can cure me from my addiction to torts. Also
to blame for my hopeless condition was Prosser's anointed successor, the
great John Fleming, author of the Commonwealth's Bible on British tort
law,' who taught the same torts course at Berkeley to another section, in
which I also participated, joyfully, as the moustache-wearing Fleming
mischievously bounded around the classroom emphasizing his points and
scaring the students. Can you imagine how thrilled I was? I loved it. I
looked forward to every class! Even to the examinations!
I was captivated by the subject-its capacity to help the injured; the
fascinating, human cases, many memorialized in Rabin and Sugarman's
collection, Torts Stories;4 the odd characters described in the cases; the great
judges who, often poetically, penned the notable cases-Cardozo, Holmes,
Traynor, Hand, Friendly; and the great scholars of the period who produced
the leading books and articles-Francis Bohlen, Warren Seavey, Leon
Green, Clarence Morris, Fowler Harper, Fleming James, John Wade,
Willard Pedrick, Wex Malone, Harry Kalven, and others.
Prosser and Fleming became my heroes and, inexplicably, took an
interest in me and encouraged me to become a law professor at Toronto's
Osgoode Hall Law School, my alma mater, to write a treatise and to edit a
casebook on Canadian Tort Law, which I undertook to do, did do, and,
miraculously, am still engaged in doing. It would have been churlish,
indeed foolish, of me to have done otherwise! My casebook, which I took
over from C. A. Wright after his death (now in its thirteenth edition, thanks
1. w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977).
3. JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS (9th ed. 1998).
4. TORTS STORIES (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugannan eds., 2003).
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to Lewis Klar and Bruce Feldthusen') and my treatise (now in its eighth
edition,6 thanks again to Bruce) as you might expect, utilized the basic
structure of the Restatement of Torts and borrowed many Prosserian ideas,
some of which infiltrated Canadian legal education and, gradually, the
Canadian legal system.
For nearly two decades, until I became a judge in 1978, I joyfully taught
full time at Osgoode Hall, Canada's leading law school, wrote about the
Canadian law of torts, lectured at many conferences across Canada, the
United States, and around the world-namely, Oxford, India, Paris, Rio de
Janeiro, Australia, Switzerland-testified before Royal Commissions in the
United Kingdom and British Columbia and even before the U.S. Senate in
the 1970s about Canada's "peaceful coexistence" automobile insurance
plan.
Tort law teaching has been very good to me and my children. It was not
as lucrative as a career in corporate or tax law might have been, nor was it as
exciting as criminal law and constitutional law, but it was a dignified,
worthwhile, and enjoyable endeavor which, indirectly perhaps, made a
difference in the lives of many individuals ensnared in a tort system of
which they had little understanding. All three of my daughters eventually
graduated from law school and, thankfully, married fellow classmates.
Sadly, only two of them work in the torts field. I fully expect that I will
have better luck with my seven grandchildren, all of whom will become tort
lawyers. They now range in age from seven to seventeen, but except for
one, so far show no interest in my plan. My wonderful wife, Marjorie,
graciously tolerated my addiction to torts, often contributing insights,
passion, and humor that, to use the Hollywood phrase, would "punch up"
my material (which, incidentally, included this material and more of my
judicial decisions than I would publicly admit).
And now as dessert, as if I needed one, these last eleven years I have
been embraced and adopted at Pepperdine, and amazingly, the current titans
of torts have come here today, at the invitation of our Law Review, to
discuss my beloved law of torts with us; to assess its impact; and to help
explain, rationalize, humanize, and improve it.
When I returned to Canada from Berkeley in 1961, I was imbued with
the spirit of a humane and caring American tort law, which I believed was
5. ALLEN M. LINDEN, LEWIS N. KLAR & BRUCE FELDTHUSEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW: CASES,
NOTES AND MATERIAL (13th ed. 2009).
6. ALLEN M. LINDEN & BRUCE FELDTHUSEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW (8th ed. 2009).
7. Allen M. Linden, Peaceful Coexistence and Automobile Accident Compensation, 9 CAN. B.J.
5 (1966).
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quite splendid and, if imported, would make Canada a better place, more like
the United States. U.S. tort law was a shining beacon to me. There were
many other rookie Canadian torts teachers who had also studied in the
United States and felt the same way as I did. In those days, Canadian tort
law was virtually non-existent; it was simply British tort law, just as most
other common law fields were almost exclusively British, the Privy Council
being our Court of last resort until 1949. The Canadian courts, including the
Supreme Court of Canada, were reluctant to depart from U.K. precedent and
were still not ready to embrace whole-heartedly the robustness of American
tort law. Increasingly, our law teachers and lawyers attended U.S.
conferences, studied U.S. books, articles, and cases, and worked the best
American ideas into our books, articles, and jurisprudence, sometimes by
stealth. I recall attending and planning many meetings of the A.A.L.S. Torts
Roundtable Council in Chicago during the Christmas break with Victor
Schwartz, Marshall Shapo, and other aficionados of torts, to hear the great
torts scholars propounding their newest insights.
It is the glorious and noble central idea of U.S. tort law-redress for
wrongdoing-that makes it special, so special that some, like John
Goldberg, have opined that it is a constitutional imperative.8 The notion that
any individual in America who feels wronged may challenge a wrongdoer
by launching a civil law suit seeking compensation for his or her individual
loss before a jury of ordinary citizens is truly remarkable. This right is
embedded deep in the soul of American culture, as Shapo has shown us.9
This is not a phony right, but a real one, although it is sometimes fraught
with difficulties-legal, procedural, tactical, and financial. The symbolism
of this open system, however, as well as its actual effect, is truly astounding
when you think of it-any person injured by Vioxx or a defective Toyota,
for example, is empowered to challenge a massive corporation either
individually or as part of a class involving as many as 150 lawyers
sometimes and, if merited, secure compensation-full compensation-for
his unique injuries.
Tort law is a very human instrument, capable of providing psychological
therapy and palpably manifesting "empathy" with the litigants, an attitude
that has somehow become controversial for judges nowadays. Never forget
that the primary task of tort law is to deal with the consequences of human
tragedy, lives lost and shattered, businesses and reputations ruined.
Individuals are seeking recompense from those they believe are responsible
for their losses, but their targets also believe strongly that they are not to
blame. The psychological tension is pervasive. It is stressful for the parties
8. John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a
Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005); see also JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG &
BENJAmiN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS (2010).
9. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE (2003).
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and the participants. Judges and juries must make hard choices, requiring
sensitivity and understanding, as well as knowledge of the law and its
procedures. Appellate review must keep in mind the human dramas
involved in the cases and cannot let the system get bogged down in complex
procedural impediments, although these elements are, of course, necessary
to ensure that the system is fairly administered.
Let me not leave the impression that tort law is, or should be,
exclusively plaintiff-or victim-oriented. Defendants also deserve
empathetic treatment, for tort law also serves to vindicate those who stand
accused of wrongdoing by mistaken, misguided, or lying challengers. Tort
law is a defender of liberty and freedom, the valuable right to do as one
pleases, as long as one does not wrongfully injure one's neighbor. Tort
courts often decide, as they should, where the plaintiffs case has not been
established, that the doctor being sued did nothing wrong, that the driver
who collided with the child running across the street could have done
nothing to prevent the accident, that the newspaper accused of libel printed
the truth, that the manufacturer of the drug properly warned about its side-
effects, that the corporate managers did not cheat their shareholders, and so
on.
In addition to this ordinary and human aspect of tort law, deciding
whether to redress injury, I have described what I call the ombudsman
function of tort law'o-the opportunity that is available to some tort
claimants to challenge the powerful and seek not only compensation, but
perhaps more importantly, to empower the injured, to educate, to spur
legislative actions, and to make the world safer. This private attorney
general role, which has been praised by Michael Rustad and others,"
hopefully helps make America and the world less dangerous. Of course,
there are other mechanisms for doing this-criminal law, administrative law,
ordinary commercial and human influences-but when they are ineffective,
as they often are, tort law is there as a secondary "sentinel of safety."
Professor Gillian Hadfield, in her recent study of 9/11 victims, has shown
that some of the families, who rejected the government's compensation
payments and launched civil actions, were motivated not so much by
10. A. M. Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, 51 CAN. B. REV. 155 (1973); see also Allen M.
Linden, Reconsidering Tort Law as Ombudsman, in ISSUES IN TORT LAW (Freda M. Steele & Sanda
Rogers-Magnet eds., 1983); Allen M. Linden, Torts Tomorrow-Empowering the Injured, in TORTS
TOMORROW 321 (Nicholas J. Mullany & Allen M. Linden eds., 1998); John W. Wade, Tort Law as
Ombudsman, 65 OR. L. REv. 309 (1986); Marshall S. Shapo, Changing Frontiers in Torts: Vistas for
the 70's, 22 STAN. L. REv. 330, 333 (1970).
11. THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2001); see also
CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG
BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW (2001).
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monetary gain, but by a "strong sense of the duty to act as an agent of the
community to gain information about what happened, to hold people
accountable and to play a role in prompting responsive change."l 2 This
ombudsman function of tort law is rarely exercised, and should only be only
exercised as an integral and necessary part of deciding cases. Judges usually
prefer to avoid these controversial tort cases as they prefer to avoid
controversial cases in other fields. But it is no power trip for judges, in
exercising their solemn decision-making authority, to occasionally elaborate
a novel aspect of tort law. There is no need to shrink from this indirect,
public function of tort law, nor to apologize for it; it has always been a vital
part of the common law tradition.13
We are met today to assess the value of American tort law and its
influence on the tort law of other countries. We are asking the question:
"Does the world still need U.S. tort law?" Like all other aspects of
American culture, U.S. tort law is studied abroad, adopted sometimes and
spurned at other times. As for Canada, U.S. tort law has long had a
significant influence. That influence has waxed and waned at different
periods of our history. Remember the early English-speaking settlers to
Canada were largely comprised of American colonists who disapproved of
the 1776 revolution and moved north, preferring to remain loyal to the
British Crown, so that distrust of the radical U.S. "patriots" was endemic
among the early English-speaking Canadians. Rather than embracing the
bracing challenge of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," the early
English-speaking Canadians preferred to include in their constitution the
more comfortable ideal of "peace, order, and good government." That
fundamental difference in the two cultures is apparent to this day in the
attitude of Canadians to many things American, including tort law; it is
definitely not a love/hate relationship-it is more of an admiration/concern
relationship. There is much that Canadians admire about U.S. tort law, but
also much that causes concern. One might describe the Canadian attitude as
ambivalent, perhaps even schizophrenic at times. Let me talk about some
examples.
One early example of the positive U.S. influence on Canadian tort law is
in the area of products liability. Following Cardozo's great breakthrough in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,' 4 ending the privity rule for manufacturer
liability, the Canadian courts swiftly and quietly adopted that negligence
approach in Ross v. Dunstall" and Buckley v. Mott.'6 It was not until 1932,
12. Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and Courthouse: Experiences with
the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 645, 673 (2008).
13. But see John C. P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L.
REv. 1501, 1515 (2002).
14. 1lI N.E. 1050 (1916).
15. [1921] 62 S.C.R. 393 (Can.).
16. [1919] 50 D.L.R. 408 (Can. N.S. S.C.).
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over a decade later, that the British courts, without giving the Canadian
courts any credit for getting there earlier, discovered MacPherson and
incorporated it into British law, much more eloquently and flamboyantly in
Donoghue v. Stevenson," also known as the snail-in-the-bottle case, that
transformed products liability law throughout the Commonwealth.
Strangely, however, when the next U.S. revolution occurred, the strict
liability revolution in the 1960s, the Canadian courts refused to follow the
United States, even though most Canadian scholars urged them to do so.' 8
Although two provinces did so legislatively,' 9 what Prosser described as the
"most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the
entire history of the law of torts," 20 caused nary a ripple on our placid
Canadian waters, even though the products involved were the same and the
manufacturers were the same companies or their subsidiaries. Paradoxically,
U.S. manufacturers were and still are better shielded from tort liability to
injured Canadian consumers in Canada, a foreign country, than they are in
the United States, their homeland.2' Subsequent history, including the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, has shown that maybe our
courts were right to hold back, at least for design and warning defects, and
that maybe the ordinary negligence principle of MacPherson, with the aid of
res ipsa loquitur and other devices, gave adequate protection to Canadians in
this area, without chasing away American business enterprise.
Another early example of U.S. influence was the law of rescuers.
British courts at first had difficulty with rescuers, denying liability because
of voluntary assumption of risk or lack of causation.22 The poetic prose of
Justice Cardozo in Wagner v. International Railway,23 "[d]anger invites
rescue," was specifically quoted by a British trial judge in Haynes v.
Harwood 24 who referred to the "well-known American Judge Cardozo," as
did the Court of Appeal, 25 which affirmed the decision and also cited a
supportive article by an expatriate American working at Oxford, Arthur L.
Goodhart, something not normally done in those days. Of course, the
17. [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.).
18. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REV. 791 (1966).
19. New Brunswick and Saskatchewan.
20. Prosser, supra note 18, at 793-94; see also LINDEN & FELDTHUSEN,supra note 6, at 655.
21. See Bruce Feldthusen, Recent Development in the Canadian Law of Punitive Damages, 16
CAN. Bus. L.J. 241 (1990).
22. See Cutler v. United Dairies (London) Ltd., [1933] 2 K.B. 297 (C.A.).
23. 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
24. [1934] 2 K.B. 240, affid, [1935] 1 K.B. 146 (C.A.).
25. See id. at 247; 1 K.B. at 163.
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Canadians happily followed the United Kingdom following the United
States, but unknown to the world, the Canadian courts had, here too, quietly
got there first in 1910, when an unknown Canadian jurist from Manitoba,
Justice Albert Richards, declared in Seymour v. Winnipeg Electric Railway
Co.26 that "those who risk their safety in attempting to rescue others who are
put in peril .. . are entitled to claim compensation."27
One recent example of the schizophrenic influence U.S. law has had on
Canadian law is the case of Grant v. Torstar Corp.,28 a libel case. In the
past, publication of erroneous factual information led to strict liability,
regardless of the lack of fault of the communicator. In New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,29 the U.S. Supreme Court changed that, protecting erroneous
information about public figures, unless there was proof of "actual malice"
by the defendant. When Canadian libel lawyers tried to import this muscular
principle into Canadian defamation law following the 1982 adoption of our
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Canadian Supreme Court
balked and refused to do so, 30 preferring instead to protect reputation rather
than promoting freedom of expression. 3' This led to a booming libel
litigation business in Canada and the United Kingdom, where public figures
often sued non-malicious but careless libelers to avoid the New York Times
rule, sometimes with success.
However, further reflection has now led to an adjustment of this
Canadian hesitancy, but the American rule has still not been adopted fully.
In Grant v. Torstar Corp., the Supreme Court of Canada, obviously
influenced by the evolving U.S. jurisprudence, but somewhat more timidly
and half-heartedly, created a new libel defense of responsible
communication on matters of public interest, which it added to the existing
defenses of fair comment and the various privileges. 32 This new defense
allows publishers to escape liability if they can establish that they acted
responsibly in attempting to verify the information they published about a
matter of public interest. As you can see, this is a halfway house between
the U.S. malice test and the former strict liability rule. This approach
demonstrates the general attitude of Canadian courts towards U.S. tort law-
a willingness to consider it, but a reluctance to follow it completely.
Clearly, the robust freedom of speech permitted in the United States is still
too robust for Canadian judges, who were influenced into loosening the law
26. (1910), 19 Man. R. 412 (Can. Man. C.A.).
27. For other examples, see generally Allen M. Linden, The American Influence on Canadian
Tort Law, 50 UCLA L. REv. 407 (2002).
28. [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (Can.).
29. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30. See Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.).
31. See 1 RAYMOND E. BROWN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION IN CANADA 6 (1987).
32. See Grant, 3 S.C.R. 640, para. 95.
33. See id. para. 98.
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by relying on the constitutional values embedded in our Charter, but were
also cognizant of the danger to reputation by enlarging the protection
further. Ambivalence is not necessarily a vice, at least not in Canada.
When the no-fault auto insurance debate exploded in the United States
in the 1960s with Keeton and O'Connell's brilliant book, Basic Protection
for the Traffic Victim, 34 leading some states to legislate a variety of plans,35
Canadians also became engaged. This was understandable because the
original no-fault plan for auto accidents had been enacted in Saskatchewan
in 1946, but it was a government-run plan that was not popular elsewhere.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Canadian provinces, not unlike U.S. states, adopted
a variety of plans-some private and some public, some "add-on" (which I
named "peaceful coexistence"), one threshold (Ontario), one pure (Quebec),
and one even allowing a choice between fault or no fault (Saskatchewan).
There are many other areas of U.S. influence on Canadian tort law.
Bruce Feldthusen has outlined the impact of U.S. law on compensation for
economic losses.3 8 In resolving the issue of breach of statute in negligence
law, the Supreme Court of Canada relied on Ezra Thayer's 1913 article and
Clarence Morris's 1932 article, both published in the Harvard Law Review,
and the Restatement (Second) of Torts in deciding that breach of penal
statute would be treated as evidence of negligence. 39 As for informed
consent in medical cases, Canada adopted the U.S. reasonable patient
standard and the objective theory of causation.40 The learned intermediary
doctrine was lifted from U.S. law by the Supreme Court of Canada.4 ' The
issue of caps on general damages, which has so exercised U.S. courts,
legislatures, and scholars, was resolved judicially in 1978 by the Supreme
Court of Canada, which placed a $100,000 maximum on these damages, but
34. ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM:
A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965).
35. For example, states like Massachusetts, Florida, Connecticut, New Jersey, Michigan, and
New York enacted pure no-fault insurance statutes. See M.G. WOODROOF III ET AL., AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAW, 439-69 (1974).
36. For more on Saskatchewan Plan, see id. at 417-18.
37. For a chart describing all Canadian provincial plans, see LINDEN, KLAR & FELDTHUSEN,
supra note 5, at 786.
38. See Bruce Feldthusen, What the United States Taught the Commonwealth About Pure
Economic Loss: Time to Repay the Favor, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 309 (2011).
39. See The Queen v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205 (Can.) (citing Ezra Ripley
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REv. 317, 225 (1914); Clarence Morris, The
Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 36 HARV. L. REV. 453 (1933); and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 286, 288A, 288B (1966)).
40. See Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880 (Can.) (following Canterbury v. Spense, 474 F.2d
772 (1972) and Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92 (1914)).
41. See Hollis v. Dow Coming Corp., [1995) 4 S.C.R. 634 (Can.).
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allowing the maximum to rise with inflation to $300,000 today.42 The
runaway U.S. punitive damages problem and the efforts to resolve it spurred
the Canadian Supreme Court to wisely address it, even though this problem
was non-existent in Canada, with the highest such award ever made being
only $1 million.4 3
But the light of this shining beacon of U.S. tort law has dimmed in
recent years. Following The Tort Policy Working Group Report (1986) and
under the onslaught of the American Tort Reform Association, the Chamber
of Commerce, PLAC, and other powerful business interests, and responsive
to what many perceived to be irresponsibly generous tort law, courts and
legislatures began to downsize U.S. tort law, something that may have been
necessary. The television, movie, and publishing industry has become an
enthusiastic accomplice to these forces by portraying tort lawyers in a
negative light-as alcoholics, dishonest, sleazy, and money-grubbing. The
distortion of the facts of the much-publicized McDonald's hot coffee case
has done more harm to the U.S. tort system around the world than anyone
could imagine, especially because the actual facts portray not an
embarrassment, but rather a great triumph for tort law." The O.J. Simpson
criminal trial severely damaged the U.S. criminal justice system, but the
civil trial's redemption of that system, finding O.J. civilly liable in tort, is
totally unknown. Lawyer jokes are so widespread and poisonous that one of
our most respected scholars, Marc Galanter, wrote an entire book, Lowering
the Bar, analyzing and trying to explain why these lawyer jokes are so
omnipresent in the United States 45
As a result, attitudes toward tort law are changing; there has been a
"retreat" in the United Kingdom. The Canadian Supreme Court has placed a
virtual lid on new tort duties. The Australians, as Professor Cane has shown,
have moved dramatically to rein in tort law legislatively.4 6 Judges and juries
everywhere are becoming tougher and tougher, often dismissing cases that
years ago would have succeeded. Many believe that, although the tort
reform movement may have been necessary originally, the pendulum has
swung too far. Tort law, some say, is losing its humanity. Icy rationality
and fearful negativity are replacing judicial and jury empathy. The hard
philosophy of Hobbes is supplanting that of Rousseau.
But it is not so much substantive tort law that is primarily to blame; it is
mostly the procedural quagmire through which tort claims must navigate.
While much of this may be necessary in huge cases and class actions, it is
not needed in routine ones. Dilatoriness, wastefulness, and the ruthlessness
42. See Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 (Can.).
43. See Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595 (Can.).
44. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Rests., P.T.S., Inc., 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. 1994).
45. See MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE (2006).
46. See Peter Cane, Searchingfor United States Tort Law in the Antipodes, 38 PEPP. L. REv. 257,
265-70 (2011).
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of the procedures employed in America now infect routine tort litigation.
There are more and more hurdles to overcome, and more and more pitfalls
for the injured to avoid. Endless interrogatories, repetitious discoveries,
voluminous productions, costly experts, and harassing motions may
sometimes be useful, but they inevitably cause delay, increase the costs, and
prolong the worrying and suffering of the claimants-something that
benefits only the defense side and incidentally increases its billable hours,
but not the contingency fees of the claimants' attorneys. Judges, upon the
urging of defense counsel on procedural, technical, or jurisdictional grounds,
sometimes dismiss cases on the pleadings alone or at the summary judgment
stage without even allowing claimants a chance to present their cases before
a jury, ending any settlement discussions. This is a Draconian way to reduce
the crowded dockets awaiting trial.
One of the much-heralded reforms in recent years in the United States,
Canada, and elsewhere is the Apology Act.47 This popular new law is
supposed to be a humane development, encouraging healing and
reconciliation between parties, but some say that it is really just another so-
called "reform" that allows defense attorneys to keep evidence of apologies,
which express sorrow and perhaps responsibility for accidents by alleged
tortfeasors, from being introduced into evidence at a trial, where they may
damage the defense and be of assistance to the claimant occasionally.
With its increasingly complex procedure and content, tort law, like tax
law, is becoming an ally of the corporate community, rather than a balanced
friend and protector of ordinary people, who seem now to be more and more
alone in this dog-eat-dog, competitive, selfish, and sometimes ruthless
market-driven world.
In my view, we torts teachers have an obligation, in addition to teaching
basic tort principles with rigor and producing first-rate scholarly work, to
instill in our students a sense of decency, civility, fairness, and compassion.
We must teach our students humanity as well as rationality, exposing them
to the social facts of injury and the problems many people have in paying for
medical care and securing replacement of lost wages, with and without tort
law. We must illuminate both the necessity and the difficulty of safety
regulations for consumers as well as for industry. We must also advise our
students, when they enter the practice of law, on both sides, to conduct
themselves with integrity and balance, to be more open to settle cases sooner
and with less hostility than what now seems to be the case. We must help
47. See Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180, 182 (2000);
John C. Kleefeld, Thinking Like a Human: British Columbia's Apology Act, 40 U.B.C. L. REv. 769
(2007).
225
our students to understand the concern of the business community when
innocent defendants are being blackmailed by avaricious, overreaching
plaintiffs in trivial, exaggerated, or phony lawsuits. There are almost always
two sides to every tort case; often both parties can be "guilty" and
"innocent" in part. Plaintiffs must make moderate, not outlandish, demands;
defendants should make reasonable, not insulting, offers. But we should not
condone the tactics sometimes employed by defendants, their insurers, and
their attorneys who, even in obviously meritorious cases, use every
procedural device, every delaying excuse, and even sometimes unsavory
tactics to thwart the cause of justice. The vicious procedural and evidentiary
ethos that is poisoning the U.S. tort system, with its overly competitive and
aggressive spirit, portrays an adversary system run wild, hampering the fair
and efficient resolution of tort cases.
One new idea to consider as an antidote to these delays and costly
procedural maneuvers is a so far totally unnoticed development in Ireland-
the Irish have established a Personal Injuries Assessment Board, a bold
agency created to speed up settlements in tort cases at less legal cost.4 8
Injured persons, before suing, apply to this Board for an independent
assessment of their claims and, if the respondent agrees, a valuation decision
by the Board is normally made within nine months on the documents
submitted.4 9 No legal costs are awarded except those incurred to comply
with the act.50 Something like seventy-five per cent of these claims are
settled on the basis of the board's assessment." If they are not, the Board
may authorize the parties to proceed to court, but cost penalties may be
awarded against the respondent where the court award exceeds the Board's
assessment, or against the plaintiff if the court award is less.5 2
Administrative costs have been cut to ten per cent 3  Such an institution
deserves study in America and other places as a possible method of reducing
court congestion and speeding up settlements at less cost, at least for routine
cases.
My vision of the future of tort law, at least until universal protection
against injury and illness is achieved, is perhaps a naive one: a fair and
efficient system that compensates the deserving justly, but not extravagantly,
and that protects innocent defendants from unfounded claims, fairly but not
48. See Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 (Act No. 46/2003) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2003/enlact/pub/0046/secOO46.html.
49. See id. para. 49; Jonathon Ilan, Four Years of Personal Injuries Board: Assessing Its Impact
(Mar. 2009), http://www.ucd.ie/roads/roads-documents/compcultwp%20no2.pdf.
50. Guidelines on Legal Costs Under Section 44 of PIAB Act 2003, INJURIESBOARD.IE, 3 (July
2009), http://www.injuriesboardie/eng/Fonns-andPublications/Guidelines/Section44 Guidelines.pdf.
51. See Annual Report & Accounts 2009, PERSONAL INJURES ASSESSMENT BOARD, 17 (Aug.
2010), http://www.deti.ie/publications/corporate/2009/lnjuriesBoardAnnualReport09_EN.pdf.
52. Most Frequently Asked Questions, INJURIESBOARD.IE, Q25, http://www.injuriesboard.ie/eng/
FAQ/#25 (last visited Dec. 24, 2010).
53. PERSONAL INJURIES ASSESSMENT BOARD, supra note 51, at 5.
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cruelly. I believe that U.S. tort law should reflect humane concern for the
injured, as an aspect of American society that underscores not its selfishness
but its decency and caring side, which is so widespread in this great country,
as the world has witnessed in Haiti, Chile, Indonesia, New Orleans, Africa,
and elsewhere.
One dramatic symbolic measure that I have advocated for at least five
decades is the adoption in the United States and the Commonwealth of a
general civil duty of easy rescue, a Bad Samaritan law, as exists in Europe,
three American states (Vermont, Minnesota, and Rhode Island), and the
Province of Quebec. Propounded over a century ago by Dean James Barr
Ames of Harvard Law School54 and supported by Dean Prosser in all the
editions of his great book," the adoption of this idea has been resisted by
almost all legislatures, all state courts, and all three versions of the
Restatement of Torts. I am pleased that there has finally been some partial
legislative movement in this direction in some states. Good Samaritans who
do come to the aid of another, and there are many, are usually immunized
(or partially immunized) from liability by statute, and they are eligible
through tort action for compensation from those who created the danger at
common law. Most states require motorists involved in accidents to stop
and render assistance. Some states by penal statute require individuals to
report crime and to report sexual abuse of children, with a few state courts
creating a civil duty based on this legislation, 5 but so far this is only a
trickle. The Restatement (Third) of Torts58 has lengthened its list of special
relationships requiring rescue from four (carrier, innkeeper, custodian, and
possessor of land) to seven (adding to the list landlord, employer, and
school). Parents, other family members, and companions were sadly not
added to the list, although discussed hopefully, as the jurisprudence did not
yet justify it. There is still a long way to go.
Let me bask in the sunshine of what one caring and courageous
Canadian province did. In the Province of Quebec, its Charter of Human
Rights and Freedoms," which has a quasi-constitutional effect, contains the
following words:
54. James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 110 (1908). But cf Francis H.
Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 219
(1908).
55. WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 194 (1st ed. 1941); 185 (2nd ed. 1955); 338 (3rd ed.
1964); 343 (4th ed. 1971); 343 (5th ed. 1984) (posthumously).
56. See, e.g., Cal. Veh. Code § 20001 (West 2011).
57. See J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998).
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 34 (1998).
59. R.S.Q., c. C-12.
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Every human being whose life is in peril has a right to
assistance .... Every person must come to the aid of anyone whose
life is in peril, either personally or calling for aid, by giving him
necessary and immediate physical assistance, unless it involves
danger to himself or a third person, or he has another valid reason.
As you can see, Quebec is a province that cares about its people's safety
and is ready constitutionally to protect them in many ways, including
requiring fellow citizens to assist in times of danger. Quebec, like France,
believes not only in liberty and equality, but also infraternity. It embraces a
view like Bob Cochran's warm communitarianism, something we need more
of today.60
Although the objections to this measure for the United States and other
commonwealth countries are worthy of respect, the argument for a general
affirmative duty is more compelling to me. The argument here is grounded
largely on values, for it is hard to contend that such a change in the law will
produce a flurry of additional rescue efforts. My main plea here is that we
torts people should, in our circumscribed but significant domain, ensure that
our tort law is reflective of the best in our culture, incorporating the decency
and humanitarianism that is the hallmark of Americans and other English-
speaking people.
As I have mentioned, the American tort system became a shining
beacon for the world, beckoning other countries to provide just and generous
redress to their victims of tortious conduct. It was this incandescent light
that drew me to Berkeley in 1960 to study torts with the great Prosser and
Fleming and then to return home to teach. Soon after, it was this same
beacon that ensnared me in the Canadian thalidomide litigation, when I was
consulted by a law firm in Toronto about whether it should undertake to
represent a thalidomide family with a badly damaged daughter in a lawsuit
against the drug company. Against my advice, the senior partner declined,
explaining to me: "This firm is not a charitable organization." He handed
me the file, saying that I was welcome to pursue the claim myself if I
believed so much in the case. Other Canadian law firms also passed.
Realizing my limitations and the insurmountable odds against such a claim
succeeding in Canada, I had an epiphany one sleepless night-try to get an
American law firm to do it! I interviewed and rejected as a possible
champion, Melvin Belli, whom I knew slightly, but he was tied up in the
Jack Ruby defense at the time. I then approached a respected Cleveland law
firm, Spangenberg, Traci, and Co., which bravely accepted the challenge.
Eventually, a fair settlement for the thalidomide family I helped, as well as
for the families of the many other Canadian children, was achieved.
60. ROBERT F. COCHRAN JR. & ROBERT M. ACKERMAN, LAW AND COMMUNITY: THE CASE OF
TORTS (2004).
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Whereas the Bad Samaritan Canadian legal system failed to act to help these
tragedy-struck Canadian families, the U.S. tort system and the U.S. bar, to
its great credit, did not walk by, but nobly came to the rescue.
My main focus in this enduring cause of mine is the educational,
didactic, or "expressive" function of tort law,6 1 not necessarily its
compensatory or deterrent role. Tort law, like all law, can influence
attitudes in law-abiding citizens about right and wrong. That is one function
of all law, especially criminal law, human rights law, and constitutional law.
Consequently, our law supports those who do the right things and denounces
those who do the wrong things. When American law teaches that one need
not assist someone in danger, it diminishes the moral stature of that law,
both at home and abroad.
When Cain, after killing his brother Abel, was questioned about the
whereabouts of Abel, he responded evasively and asked, "Am I my brother's
keeper?" 62 Unlike Cain, we should answer "yes." We are and should be our
"brothers' keepers." The soul of commonwealth tort law has been grounded
on this noble ideal for decades: the glorious neighbor principle-that one
should act reasonably in order to avoid foreseeable injuries to one's
neighbors. This neighbor principle, born in Donoghue v. Stevenson,63 the
House of Lords' snail-in-the-bottle case from 1932, is a diluted variation of
the great Christian principle-love your neighbor-a principle that most
great religions subscribe to. It challenges us to dream of a beautiful world
where people care about one another, feel responsible for one another, and
even (dare I say it) love one another.
Have we learned anything from the recent economic collapse spawned
in part by the "dog-eat-dog," "bottom-line" commercialism, and the
selfishness of the "ownership society"? Can we return to a more
compassionate and caring society, where we help our neighbors, not ignore
them or fleece them? Can tort law and torts teachers, at least in our small
but significant domain, help in this renaissance? My dream, a nalve,
romantic, and hopeless one perhaps, is that the recent bailouts, stimulus
packages, and the compassionate rhetoric and actions of the new
administration seeking to protect ordinary people, to control the unduly
avaricious, and to reach out in a more sensitive way to the rest of the world,
will ignite a fresh awakening of generosity in America, which will be
reflected in a more empathetic tort law, which hopefully will include a
general duty of easy rescue.
61. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996).
62. Genesis 4:9.
63. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.).
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An agenda for the years ahead would include the following:
1. We should continue to support the work of the American Law
Institute (ALI) in its restatement efforts. The Restatement (Third) of Torts,
covering physical and emotional harm, is soon to be promulgated by the
ALI, thanks to the efforts of dozens of great tort scholars, led by Mike
Green, Bill Power, Ellen Pryor, Jane Stapleton, and many of you who are
here today. Hopefully, this Third Restatement, and the further work that is
ongoing,65 will help to maintain and enhance the traditional balance and
humanity in the system. The Restatement (Third) of Products Liability
(1998)66 and the Apportionment of Liability (2000) project,67 although
controversial, have already begun to achieve just that.
2. Further efforts to rationalize, humanize, and render the tort system
more efficient and fair have been undertaken by legislatures, courts and
scholars, and this should continue. Class action abuses are rightly being
addressed these days. Joint liability rules are being adjusted. The harshness
of the contributory negligence defense is almost gone. Astronomical
punitive damage awards are history. We should offer more judicial
guidance to juries. The tort systems of other common law and even civil law
jurisdictions should be canvassed for new ideas to renew U.S. tort law, but
we must avoid the "unmaking" of tort law68 unless we provide for an
adequate replacement. One idea, the new federal vaccine court, deserves
more attention, perhaps enlarging its jurisdiction to include medical
malpractice generally.69
3. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques should be refined
and utilized more often in tort cases. With the help of Pepperdine's Straus
Institute for Dispute Resolution and others like it, perhaps lawyers in the
future will come to resemble peacemakers more than gladiators. But we
must also guard against the pollution of the ADR system by disingenuous
insurers and unethical and money-driven mediators, who sometimes do not
help to deliver juster justice as they should.
4. One of the best ways to reduce the pressure on the tort system is for
America to fill in the gaps in the U.S. medical and social welfare system,
which, even after the recent protracted battle in Congress, still covers the
injured much less generously than most other countries in the Western
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM (2010).
65. Ellen Pryor, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Coordination and Continuation, 44 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1383 (2009).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998).
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. (2000).
68. JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW (2004); Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-
makers, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 455 (1999).
69. See, e.g., Deborah F. Buckman, Construction and Application of Preemption Provisions of
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986 ("Vaccine Act"), 42 U.S.C.A. §
300aa-1 et seq., 39 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 155 (2009).
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world. The United States has protected workers for years, but auto accident
victims are still not protected by no-fault plans in many states, including
California. The better the injured are protected by non-tort compensation,
the less need there is for tort compensation. The current health care debate
demonstrates, however, that there is sadly much resistance to serious reform
in America. Yet Congress responded swiftly and humanely to the 9/11
tragedy by establishing a unique no-fault compensation system for the
victims, which distributed fair compensation to 97% of the 5,560 victims
within thirteen months at little administrative cost.70 A federal legislative
solution to the messy asbestos litigation has been tried, but it has failed.
While a comprehensive accident compensation scheme like that in New
Zealand,n so admired by Stephen Sugarman as well as other dreamers like
me, appears beyond America's grasp for now, perhaps some individual
humane and adventurous states will study these more radical options and
enact versions of them, hopefully leaving some role for tort law.
5. In addition to these advances, tort law must survive not only as a
vital system of civil recourse, but also as society's radar for early detection
of emerging dangers. It takes time for legislatures to notice and to respond
to emerging new health and safety risks. In the interim, tort lawyers launch
civil suits, often unsuccessfully at first, which spotlight danger, even if
compensation may not be obtained. Starting a tenuous, hopeless, even
ridiculous, lawsuit may alert people to some unseen peril, even though it
never succeeds or even reaches trial. In my view, it is better for a
disgruntled citizen to pursue his imagined tormentor with a writ than with a
rifle. The saga of tobacco litigation demonstrates that, with persistence, tort
law can eventually direct serious public attention toward a serious health
risk. The producers of television, music, and movies, the fast food industry,
and the alcohol and gun manufacturers may succeed in avoiding tort liability
for years, but one day, with the help of tort law's pressure, the negative
publicity generated by tort actions may persuade them to behave more
responsibility. Hopefully, the dreadful sex abuse cases, many involving
celebrities, clergy, and politicians, that are reported widely in the media are
teaching us more about that problem and are changing attitudes and
behavior. The civil actions for corporate wrongdoing, evidenced by the
Enron scandal amongst others, may promote better ethics and more honesty
70. See Robert L. Rabin, The September Ilth Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
769 (2003); KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT is LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005).
71. Accident Rehabilitation Compensation Insurance Act 1992 (N.Z.).
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in the business community. The rediscovery of the Alien Tort Statute7 may
foster more responsible corporate conduct all around the world, as Roger
Alford explains. Remember, a court that says "no" in these novel cases
may not help the particular claimant, but it still may serve society as well as
one which says "yes" by warning society about the existence of the problem
and the need for addressing it outside the tort system.
6. While tort litigation will not eradicate terror, torture, and other
crimes against humanity, just as mighty armies cannot, it may supply some
compensation to victims, some deterrence, some psychological satisfaction,
some education, and some impetus to more effective governmental action in
this area. One author asserts that there is a "symbolic" value in these
actions, which furnish some "recognition for, and emotional vindication of,
the victims" and "places moral and political pressure on rights-abusing
governments."74 This is certainly a worthy endeavor.
This then is my continuing song of torts, sung again this day in the hope
that U.S. tort law and U.S. tortaholics will continue to serve our society and
its injured with honor, integrity, responsibility, balance, and humanity, and
that the shining beacon of U.S. tort law, so full of hope and promise which
entranced me long ago, will once again shine brightly for all the world to
witness in wonder and gratitude, for it truly reflects the hope and promise of
America itself.
Finally, I will answer the question-does the world still need U.S. tort
law? Despite its doctrinal imperfections and its procedure frailties, I
respond resoundingly-YES!
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
73. Roger P. Alford, Apportioning Responsibility Among Joint Tortfeasors for International Law
Violations, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 233, 235-36 (2010).
74. John Terry, Taking Fildrtiga on the Road: Why Courts Outside the United States Should
Accept Jurisdiction Over Actions Involving Torture Committed Abroad, in TORTURE AS TORT:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION 109, 133 (Craig Scott ed., 2001).
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